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This paper argues for a comprehensive conception of empathy as comprising epistemic,
affective, and motivational elements and introduces the ancient Stoic theory of
attachment (Greek, oikeiōsis) as a model for describing the embodied, emotional
response to others that we take to be distinctive of empathy. Our argument entails
that in order to provide a suitable conceptual framework for the interdisciplinary study
of empathy one must extend the scope of recent “simulationalist” and “enactivist”
accounts of empathy in two important respects. First, against the enactivist assumption
that human mindreading capacities primarily rely on an immediate, quasi-perceptual
understanding of other’s intentional states, we draw on Alfred Schutz’ analysis of
social understanding to argue that reflective types of understanding play a distinct, but
equally fundamental role in empathic engagements. Second, we insist that empathy also
involves an affective response toward the other and their situation (as the empathizer
perceives this). We suggest analyzing this response in terms of the Stoic concepts
of attachment, concern, and a fundamental type of prosocial motivation, that can
best be described as an “extended partiality.” By way of conclusion, we integrate the
above concepts into a comprehensive conceptual framework for the study of empathy
and briefly relate them to current debates about empathic perception and prosocial
motivation. The result, we argue, is an account that stays neutral with regard to the exact
nature of the processes involved in producing empathy and can therefore accommodate
discussion across theoretical divides—e.g., those between enactivist, simulationalist,
and so-called theory-theorist approaches.
Keywords: empathy, stoicism, embodied cognition, attachment, phenomenology, prosocial motivation, affective
intentionality
INTRODUCTION
“Slipping into someone else’s skin”—this bodily metaphor serves as an almost dictionary definition
of empathy. In general, the body looms large when speaking about empathy and kindness. We “put
ourselves in someone else’s shoes” or “listen to our hearts” and the excessively empathic among
us have “a bleeding heart.” Nonetheless, the body occupies a somewhat un-easy place in modern
discussions of empathy, which have tended to focus on just one part of the bodies involved, namely
the brain of the empathizer.
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With inspiration from phenomenology and interaction
theory, recent accounts of empathy have pushed to transcend
this focus on a more or less isolated mind, emphasizing the
immediate, and “intercorporeal” nature of empathic interaction
(see e.g., Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009; Zahavi, 2011, 2014;
Gallagher, 2012a; Ciaunica, 2017; Fuchs, 2017; for a good review,
see Zahavi and Michael, 2018). These phenomenological and
“enactivist” accounts construe empathy as a basic type of other-
directed intentionality that enables us to directly perceive the
mental states of others through our interaction with them.
They thus form part of a broader research agenda known as
4E cognition committed to studying our cognitive processes as
embodied, extended, enactive, and embedded phenomena (for a
concise introduction, see Newen et al., 2018).
This conception of the mind as encompassing and in part
co-constituted by the body and its environment carries great
prospects for the study of interpersonal processes but arguably 4E
analyses of empathy remain underdeveloped in crucial respects.
While these phenomenologically inspired discussions of empathy
have broadened the scope on empathy by conceiving of it as an
embodied and enactive phenomenon, they have also tended to
focus exclusively on its epistemic aspects neglecting the affective
aspects at the very root of the word and broadly considered
to be central to empathy. The aim of the present paper is
to establish a conceptual framework that allows for a more
comprehensive analysis of empathy as both an epistemic and an
emotional phenomenon.
More specifically we propose to supplement the enactivist
account of basic empathy with an analysis of the affective
attitude and response involved in empathic engagements. We
develop this analysis with inspiration from the ancient Stoics’
account of affective intentionality, known as their theory of
oikeiōsis. On this theory, the bodily processes, pointed to in
enactivist accounts of empathy as enabling an immediate other-
understanding, are instead seen as producing an attitude of
attachment, concern, and extended partiality which provides
the affective foundations of interpersonal relations. The Stoic
analysis of embodied affectivity therefore nicely complements
the traditional phenomenological analysis of empathy’s epistemic
aspects and provides the conceptual means for relating the
enactivist account to the ongoing debates about empathy’s role
in motivating prosocial behavior.
In the section “Empathy: Cognitive, Emotional, Primary,
and Extended” by briefly situating the enactivist approach
within the broader debates about empathy and social
understanding and introduce one of the most extensive
accounts of enactive empathy, namely the one developed by
the German philosopher and psychiatrist Thomas Fuchs. In
the section “Social Understanding: Enactive and Reflective”
we discuss the concept of bodily resonance, taken by Fuchs to
underlie our empathic capacities, in more detail drawing on
the early phenomenologist Alfred Schutz’s (1967) analysis of
social understanding and meaning to point out the limits of such
“enactive” understanding and contrast it with explicit, “reflective”
types of social understanding. In the subsequent section, we
then introduce the Stoic theory of oikeiōsis and interpersonal
relations and compare this account of affective intentionality
with the one underlying Fuchs’ account of empathy. Having thus
delineated the epistemic and affective scope of empathy, in the
section “Discussion: Toward a Comprehensive Conception of
Empathy” we piece together our account of empathy specifying
the individual processes we take it to involve and briefly relating
it to existing, empirical debates about the attachment toward
one’s own body (so-called “Body Ownership”) and the nature of
the prosocial motivation produced by empathy.
EMPATHY: COGNITIVE, EMOTIONAL,
PRIMARY, AND EXTENDED
Before zooming in on the many debates surrounding the
concept of empathy, it may be useful to get a rough idea
about what kind of thing(s) the term “empathy” is generally
taken to refer to and how we shall use it. Batson (2009) has
distinguished two questions that students of empathy have been
interested in: “How can one know what another person is
thinking and feeling?” and “What leads one person to respond
with sensitivity and care to the suffering of another?” (Batson,
2009, p. 3). He identifies eight different psychological states
that have all been called empathy and seen as relevant to
answering one or both of the questions above. These states
are often subsumed under the terms emotional and cognitive
empathy, i.e., the ability to resonate with the emotions of others
or “feel with them” and the appreciation of their emotions
through purely cognitive means, also called perspective taking.
Batson sees this complexity as a basic fact about the study
of empathy that one needs to acknowledge and deal with
as best one can.
Our strategy for dealing with this complexity is to distinguish
between empathy as a complex emotional phenomenon and
the various empathic processes that may go into producing it.
This means that we will take a top-down approach to empathy
analyzing it in its developed form as it appears relatively late
in childhood and largely stay at the purely conceptual level of
determining what epistemic, emotional, and motivational states
empathy involves.
We tentatively define empathy as a benevolent engagement
with the affective states of others which provides us with a grasp
of their state and produces an affective response within our body.
This engagement, we take it, plausibly involves a whole range
of distinct, empathic processes, and states, which complement,
interrelate, and inform each other in intricate ways, which we are
really only beginning to grasp and describe scientifically (Batson,
2009; Zaki and Ochsner, 2012). The purpose of viewing these
various processes as elements of empathy and not in isolation
is to allow us to study their interaction and interrelations, not
just their individual workings, on the assumption that there
might be more to the whole than the sum of its parts (cf.
Zaki and Ochsner, 2012).
Our definition of empathy is deliberately vague, and in the first
instance, it only aims to provide a possibly neutral language for
speaking about the individual aspects of empathy while allowing
us to distinguish it from distinct, but closely related phenomena
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such as emotional contagion, sharing, and mindreading1. To
delineate the scope of our definition it may be useful to compare
it to some recent, prominent attempts to define empathy.
Frédérique de Vignemont, along with shifting co-authors, has
developed a highly systematic account of empathy and proposed
a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that distinguish
empathy from related phenomena (de Vignemont and Jacob,
2012; cf. de Vignemont and Singer, 2006). These are:
1. the affectivity condition: both the empathizer and the target
of her empathy experiences an affective state
2. the interpersonal similarity condition: empathizer and
target person must experience similar affective states
3. the causal path condition: the affective state of the
empathizer must be caused by the affective state of the
target person
4. the ascription condition: the empathizer must be aware of
the target person’s affective state and of the fact that this
state is the cause of her own affective state
5. the caring condition: the empathizer must care about the
target person’s affective life
Our definition retains condition (i), (iii), and (v) by insisting
that for an engagement to qualify as empathic it must be
concerned with the affective state of someone else, it must
produce an “affective response” in the empathizer, and it
must be “benevolent2.” Similar to de Vignemont, we thus
distinguish empathy from standard mindreading (in the sense
of merely registering the intentional states of others) and what
is sometimes simply called sharing [where two people experience
the same affective state but caused by the same intentional object
(Scheler, 1954)].
Condition (iv) we only accept in a slightly weaker form. By
speaking of a grasp rather than an explicit awareness of the
other’s state we thus wish to include the pre-reflective sensing
and reacting to others’ states, sometimes called “basic empathy”
(Stueber, 2006; Fernandez and Zahavi, 2020), as instances
of empathy along with the conscious ascriptions exclusively
recognized by de Vignemont. This pre-reflective awareness of
the other’s state is still sufficient to distinguish empathy from
emotional contagion, i.e., the unconscious adoption of others’
affective states as witnessed e.g., in the spreading of mass
panic (Scheler, 1954), which does not imply any awareness
of others’ states.
Condition (ii), the interpersonal similarity condition, is far
more controversial and in effect limits the scope of empathy to
cases of vicarious sharing. De Vignemont describes her account
as “simulation-based” and commits herself to the view that
1We shall use the term “mindreading” in the neutral sense of any capacity to
register the intentional states of others, not as referring to a purely mentalistic
understanding.
2On de Vignemont’s account, condition (v) is introduced in order to account for
the modulation of empathy by contextual and personal factors but it remains
somewhat unclear what this condition involves apart from the fact that de
Vignemont takes empathy to be incompatible with “an egotist stand” and likely
to be blocked by an indifferent or negative attitude toward the target person
(de Vignemont and Jacob, 2012, p. 307). We elaborate the benevolence we take
empathy to imply below, sections “Social Understanding: Enactive and Reflective”
and “Affective Intentionality: Bodily Resonance and Stoic Attachment.”
empathy relies on the recognition of mental states through
an internal simulation or enactment-imagination of that state,
which is then ascribed to the other (de Vignemont and Jacob,
2012). This narrowly simulationalist conception of empathy
is problematic since it arguably misconstrues the scope of
empathic understanding. As Dan Zahavi argues: “To insist that
the empathizer must have the same (kind of) state as the target,
is to miss what is distinctive about empathy, namely the fact that
it confronts you with the presence of an experience that you are
not living through yourself ” (Zahavi and Michael, 2018, p. 597).
By contrast, Zahavi has suggested a definition of empathy as
“a distinctive form of other-directed intentionality, distinct from
both self-awareness and ordinary object-intentionality, which
allows foreign experiences to disclose themselves as foreign rather
than as own” (Zahavi, 2014, p. 138). This definition of empathy
as a distinct type of intentionality, in turn, restricts the scope
empathy to its epistemic aspects (i.e., Batson’s first question) and
allows for empathy to appear in combination with any number
of affective states and attitudes toward others. Indeed, Zahavi
explicitly bites the bullet that on such an account “it is perfectly
coherent to think that an expert torturer may rely on empathy in
order to work out how best to push her victim’s buttons” (Zahavi
and Michael, 2018, p. 597).
This narrowly epistemic conception of empathy has a
long tradition within philosophy—especially phenomenological
philosophy where the concept originally evolved (Stueber,
2006; Zahavi, 2010)—and it creates a neat distinction between
empathy and such clearly affective phenomena as sympathy
or compassion. But it also blurs the line between empathy
and mindreading more broadly and goes against the common
intuition that empathy somehow implies a basic pro-attitude
toward the other. Since this intuition is strong enough to have
inspired an entire strand of research on empathy (i.e., the studies
of Batson’s second question), we believe that it should be reflected
in the definition of the concept.
In contrast to Zahavi and following de Vignemont, we thus
agree that empathy is a basically benevolent way of engaging with
others where both empathizer and target person experience an
affective state. Unlike de Vignemont, however, we do not assume
that these states must be similar or that the state of the empathizer
has to serve as her basis for understanding the target’s state. It is
sufficient that it is a response elicited by the engagement with that
state (through simulation or otherwise).
In defining empathy as an engagement which both reveals
the target’s affective state and produces an affective response in
the empathizer, we thus distinguish empathy from mindreading
more broadly both in terms of its proper object and its effect.
Empathy, on our view, is a type of mindreading that provides
understanding of the affective states of others (widely construed
as any state that involves the ascription of affective value, cf.
Fuchs’ concept of emotions discussed below, section “Social
Understanding: Enactive, and Reflective”), whereas mindreading
as such can deal with all types of mental states, including non-
valenced beliefs. Also, empathy requires you to feel something for
the person you empathize with, not just neutrally (or maliciously)
registering their affective state (cf. Gallagher, 2012a who talks
of empathy as involving a “primary and irreducible affective
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state—the state of feeling empathy.”). Empathy, on our account,
not only involves understanding, but also an affective response to
the state of the target person.
It should be clear by now that we cast the net wider than
many other students of empathy. As the preceding remarks
convey, we see no reason to restrict the concept to a purely
epistemic other-comprehension or associating it narrowly with
a particular type of other-comprehension. On our account, the
phenomena described by Zahavi and de Vignemont are thus
possible elements of empathy, but what sets empathy apart
is the combination of its epistemic and affective elements.
In what follows we shall try to develop an account that
encompasses all these elements. Since the majority of work on
empathy has focused on questions about the possibility of other-
comprehension (Batson, 2009; Zaki and Ochsner, 2012), we shall
start with a discussion of the epistemic aspects of empathy before
we move on, in the section “Affective Intentionality: Bodily
Resonance and Stoic Attachment” and “Discussion: Toward a
Comprehensive Conception of Empathy,” to discuss the affective
responses involved in empathy and how these interrelate with its
epistemic aspects.
Within discussions of social understanding “empathy” is often
used more or less synonymously with the term “mindreading” as
an answer to Batson’s first question of how we can understand
others3. This has traditionally been explained in terms of
“theory of mind” (ToM), i.e., the basic insight that other
people have minds and the abilities to reconstruct the inner
life of others that follows upon this insight. It is controversial,
however, whether these abilities are best understood as a
type of inference, the so-called theory-theory, or as a type of
simulation, the so-called simulation-theory (for good surveys
of the debate, see Stueber, 2006, chap. 3; Gallagher, 2012b).
Against this a growing number of researchers working within
broadly phenomenological traditions have objected that these
explanatory models unnecessarily complicate the matter by
ignoring the extent to which the “inner” states of others
are directly perceptible to us (Jensen and Moran, 2012;
Gangopadhyay, 2014 provide good overviews of this critique).
This debate is sometimes described in terms of the different
perspectives the individual approaches favor. Simulation-
theory thus assigns the first-person perspective a fundamental
significance in enabling social understanding. On this view,
it is the ability to imagine yourself being in a certain state
and then project this state onto others which explains the
human ability to recognize what others are thinking and feeling
(see e.g., Goldman, 2006; Stueber, 2006; de Vignemont and
Jacob, 2012; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2018). Theory-theory, on
the other hand, likens the interpretation of others’ behavior
and inner states to the application of a scientific theory. On
this view, social understanding relies on inferences about
other people’s behavior, facial expressions etc. based on a
theoretical knowledge about how people normally think
and feel when they behave in certain ways. This puts the
3Note that this question presupposes a more fundamental question about how we
can know that others are thinking, sometimes referred to as “the problem of other
minds.” We shall not address this issue here.
empathizer in the role of an observer viewing the target person
in a third-person perspective, drawing more or less objective
inferences based on how s/he behaves (see e.g., Premack and
Woodruff, 1978; Gopnik and Wellman, 1992; Carruthers
and Smith, 1996). Finally, phenomenological and enactivist
approaches to social understanding have stressed the fact
that we normally engage with the thoughts and feelings of
others in the context of direct social interaction where we
experience the other in an immediate and interactive second-
person perspective. Through the sensorimotor coordination
and mutual attunement that characterizes direct, physical
interaction the actions and intentions of others are immediately
intelligible to us and this enables a direct or “primary” type
of intersubjective understanding that does not rely on any
inferences or oblique ascriptions regarding their mental states
(see e.g., Gallagher, 2004, 2012b; Hutto, 2004; Zahavi, 2008;
Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009).
The basic assumption underlying the enactivist approach is
therefore that “the mind of the other is not entirely hidden
or private, but is given and manifest in the other person’s
embodied comportment,” (Gallagher, 2004, 204; cf. Fuchs and
De Jaegher, 2009, p. 469). As Gallagher points out it is only
when “everyday second-person interactions break down, or
when I have problems understanding the other person, I may
engage in a specialized theoretical approach that appeals to
third-person explanation or prediction. But such specialized
cognitive approaches do not characterize our primary or everyday
encounters with others” (Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009, p. 202).
Instead of relying only on traditional “cognitivist” approaches,
social understanding therefore needs to be studied in terms of
the enactive and embodied processes it involves (Fuchs and
De Jaegher, 2009; Froese and Fuchs, 2012; Gallagher, 2012b;
De Jaegher et al., 2017).
This enactive approach to social understanding has gained
considerable traction within recent years and, we believe, it also
offers the most promising starting point for an investigation
of empathy. The most comprehensive, enactivist account of
empathy to date is arguably the series of articles published
individually and in collaboration with other leading researchers
within the field by Thomas Fuchs, who draws extensively
on both enactive and phenomenological discussions of social
understanding (see most importantly Fuchs and De Jaegher,
2009; Froese and Fuchs, 2012; Fuchs and Koch, 2014; Fuchs, 2016,
2017).
Fuchs, like Zahavi, conceives of empathy as an immediate
perception of the other’s intentional state. He describes this
as relying on “mutual incorporation” (Fuchs and De Jaegher,
2009; Fuchs, 2016) which constitutes a form of interaffectivity
or “interbodily resonance,” i.e., a mutual attunement or
coordination in both movements and affections between
interacting subjects (Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009, p. 472–4;
Fuchs and Koch, 2014, p. 5–7). Importantly, Fuchs here assumes
that the immediate physical reaction to the other’s expressions,
e.g., the mirroring of a smile or the jolt away from an angry
roar, is co-constitutive of the affective state we experience, in
this case joy or fear. A feedback-cycle of affective responses
can therefore arise: each participant picks up and reacts to
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the state of the other who then in turn reacts to her state
(Fuchs and Koch, 2014).
The reciprocal and immediate nature of such interaction
allows for participatory sense-making and an intimate
attunement of emotional states. The interaction with others
therefore provides an immediate grasp on their emotional
states and intentions-in-action because we perceive and
participate directly in them (Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009;
Fuchs, 2013; Fuchs and Koch, 2014). As Fuchs stresses, the
sensorimotor coordination happens pre-reflectively and more
or less instantaneously and the dynamics of this inter-affective
system becomes “highly autonomous and are not directly
controlled by the partners” (Froese and Fuchs, 2012, 213;
see also Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009; Fuchs, 2016). Fuchs
therefore concludes: “Thus, emotions are not inner states that
we experience only individually or that we have to decode
in others, but primarily shared states that we experience
through interbodily affection” (Fuchs and Koch, 2014, p. 7,
their emphasis).
In contrast to de Vignemont’s simulation-based account of
empathy, Fuchs does not assume that the state of the empathizer
and target person have to be the same. They are shared in
the sense that they have their common origin in the dynamic
interaction, but this can also involve complementary reactions.
Also, we do not have to become aware of the shared state
or explicitly ascribe it to the other in order to empathize.
The understanding characteristic of this intercorporeality can
of course be made explicit and reflective, but Fuchs emphasizes
its fundamentally pre-reflective, implicit nature (Fuchs and
De Jaegher, 2009; Froese and Fuchs, 2012; Fuchs, 2017).
Supplemented by what Fuchs calls bodily memory, i.e., an
implicit, pre-reflective memory which encapsulates both the
interactive patterns of particular relationships and a more
general knowledge of how to interact with others, this enables a
fundamental kind of intersubjective understanding which Fuchs
identifies as “primary empathy” (Fuchs, 2016, 2017).
Fuchs seems to assume that this basic form of empathy
scales straight forwardly into more explicit and reflective
attempts to understand others, like the ones subsumed under
de Vignemont’s definition of empathy, without the need for
any further processes. He thus contrasts primary empathy with
any attempt to reconstruct the inner states of others by means
of logical inferences or simulation, which he calls “extended
empathy” (Fuchs, 2013, 2017). According to Fuchs, these
cognitive mechanisms are mainly relevant in cases of ambiguity
or misunderstanding, whereas primary empathy sufficiently
accounts for our everyday social interactions (Fuchs, 2017).
Extended empathy appears to be a last resort or “deprived”
version of primary empathy (Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009, p. 472).
Fuchs’ account of primary empathy thus ascribes both
psychological and epistemic immediacy to the grasp of others’
affective states provided through direct perception, i.e., it neither
involves further psychological mechanisms (such as inference,
projection or explicit ascription) nor does it require any
further epistemic justification (as provided by e.g., ToM and
“folk psychology”). His demotion of the cognitive mechanisms
associated with extended empathy to a purely auxiliary or
supplementary function, moreover, suggests that he takes
this immediacy to characterize the majority of the social
understanding involved in everyday interaction. This is a strong
claim and, as we argue in the following section, it must be
strongly modified.
While we take Fuchs’ account of empathy with its basis
in interbodily resonance and mutual incorporation to offer a
promising way of capturing the embodied and enactive character
of empathic engagements, the scope of the understanding
provided by such engagements is in our view more limited
than he appears to acknowledge. Based on a critical discussion
of the forms and limits of social understanding informed by
Schutz’s phenomenological analysis of intersubjective meaning,
the following section argues that even in everyday interaction
empathic understanding involves a complex interplay between
various processes, including both primary empathy and ToM.
The fundamental significance of interbodily resonance and
mutual incorporation for empathy, however, is not restricted
to the epistemic aspects highlighted by Fuchs, but is equally,
or perhaps even more closely, tied to their role in shaping our
affective response to others.
SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING: ENACTIVE
AND REFLECTIVE
Before we move on let us look more carefully at the account of
embodied intentionality underlying Fuchs’ account of primary
empathy. On this account, empathy relies on our body’s general
capacity to resonate with its environment. This is brought out
in his discussion of bodily resonance and embodied affectivity
(Fuchs and Koch, 2014). As Fuchs stresses “bodily feelings should
never be conceived as a mere by-product or add-on, distinct
from the emotion as such, but as the very medium of affective
intentionality.” (Fuchs and Koch, 2014, p. 3 sic). By positing a
distinctively bodily format for our affective intentionality Fuchs
assigns the body a fundamental role in shaping how we perceive
the world, allowing him to distinguish between a primary,
embodied affectivity and the reflective processes that rely on it (cf.
Goldman and de Vignemont, 2009 on this distinction between
embodied and reflective processes).
The nature of bodily feelings, however, is twofold. Every
feeling is simultaneously an affection and an expression. It
registers an affective quality of the environment through e.g.,
visual, olfactory or tactile input, while the bodily changes this
involves (facial, gestural, tensional etc.) also express our reaction
to these “affective affordances” often including a tendency to
move in certain ways, e.g., toward or away from an object (a
tendency Fuchs dubs an “e-motion”). It is this registration-
cum-reaction that Fuchs refers to by the broad term “emotion.”
Emotions, according to Fuchs, are thus the key to understanding
intentional action: “Without emotions, the world would be
without meaning or significance; nothing would attract or repel
us and motivate us to act” (Fuchs and Koch, 2014, p. 2).
When we interact with other living subjects our intrabodily
resonance becomes entwined in a reciprocal process of affection
and expression: I pick up on your expressions and inevitably
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react to them, if even in the slightest of ways, and my reaction
in turn impacts you and elicits a new expression on your part.
Like our intra-bodily resonance, this inter-bodily resonance is
circular, but it extends beyond the individual to include all the
interacting subjects thereby creating lesser or stronger feelings
of “mutual incorporation” among them. This intercorporeality
and sharing of states, as we saw above, are what enable empathic
understanding on Fuchs account (Fuchs and Koch, 2014, p. 5–7).
As Fuchs and colleagues convincingly argue, the sensorimotor
coordination and interbodily resonance involved in direct
interaction thus provides an immediate access to the emotions
and intentions of others in the sense of making these directly
perceptible to us (for a review of recent studies into the neuronal
bases of these mechanisms offering an interpretation in more
simulationalist terms, see Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2018; cf. Stueber,
2006, p. 131–152). When we interact with others the majority
of the movements, facial expressions, odors etc. they exhibit
do not seem to require the inference of a hidden inner state
in order for them to acquire meaning. In an important sense,
your expression really is your emotion (recall the definition of
bodily feelings as both affections and expressions). Thanks to the
human ability to register and react to the bodily feelings of other
living subjects their expressions therefore appear meaningful in
the same immediate way that a piece of charcoal appears black
and a stone hard.
This conception of interbodily resonance is capable of
accounting for much of the interpersonal understanding involved
in everyday encounters. It thus seems plausible that e.g., the
yelling and tenseness of another person is directly perceived
as “anger” rather than as indications allowing us to infer that
the person in question is angry. But as we suggested above,
there are also important limitations to such understanding.
The basic contours of these limitations were brought out by
Alfred Schutz in his penetrating analysis of social understanding
(1967, esp. 20–38).
Schutz’s point of departure is a critique of Scheler (1954)
who, much like Fuchs, had pointed to the immediate, pre-
reflective insight into the states of others offered by bodily
expressions as a basis for empathy. Schutz, however, insists that
this understanding is more limited than Scheler acknowledges
(on this early phenomenological debate about empathy and
Schutz’ contribution to it, see Zahavi, 2010). First of all, not all
expressions are also an attempt to express something, and even
when this is the case, the agent’s expressions only offer an indirect
insight into their intentions: seeing someone who is yelling and
raging, we immediately understand that the person is angry, but
understanding their anger is more complicated. Grasping the
full meaning of this state involves placing the agent’s expressions
within a broader context of meaning and interpreting them in
that light. This is where things get murky (Schutz, 1967, p. 22–24).
To elucidate this interpretive process Schutz, building on
Husserl’s distinction between “that which is meant” (Bedeutung)
and the act of “meaning” (Bedeuten), distinguishes between
a level of “objective” meaning and one of “subjective” or
“intended meaning” (intendierter Sinn) (Schutz, 1967, 33ff.).
As he emphasizes the interpretive schemata we apply to the
expressions of others (as well as our own) are to a large
extent shared, intersubjective and in that sense “objective,” but
this intersubjectivity always presupposes an individual act of
meaning-endowment (Sinngebung) (see further Schutz, 1967,
chap. 2). You and I may therefore agree about the meaning of
a given expression but we do so on the basis of distinct, and
possibly differing, acts of meaning. My subjective experience will
therefore necessarily differ from yours simply by virtue of it being
mine and not yours.
A basic upshot of this distinction, as we interpret it, is that
there are two levels on which you may strive to understand
the meaning others experience: understanding it at the properly
intersubjective level of identifying the meaning-content of
their expressions, actions and intentions; and understanding
how they experience this content, which remains essentially
inaccessible, because this relies on an intentional operation of
their consciousness that most often eludes even the awareness
of the agent herself (Schutz, 1967, p. 34–37). The point of this
distinction is not that social understanding is impossible, but
simply that one should be aware that the meaning one is ascribing
to others is of the intersubjective kind and as such a product
of one’s own intentionality—not the subjective meaning of the
person one is trying to understand (Schutz, 1967, p. 30–31
and esp., 37–38).
We shall not go into any detail about the elaborate and
sophisticated account of social understanding Schutz goes
on to develop, but only offer a few selective observations
(see Schutz, 1967, chap. 3; with Zahavi, 2010; León and
Zahavi, 2016). For Schutz, the lived experience prior to
any act of meaning-endowment is the privileged level of
experience and we can crucially share this immediate experience
of our existence with others through direct interaction,
interlocking our intentionality with theirs and sensing their
stream of consciousness. This immediate and pre-reflective
other-comprehension (Fremdverstehen) is the closest one gets
to the subjective meaning of others. The very act of meaning-
endowment, by contrast, is reflective in the very basic sense
that it imposes a certain meaning on our immediate perception.
The moment we begin assigning meaning to the experience of
others, we are therefore engaging in a private act of reflection
rather than the special type of perception associated with true
other-comprehension.
Corresponding to the sharing and interlocking of
intentionality, which Schutz regarded as characteristic of true
other-comprehension, Fuchs speaks of mutual incorporation
as involving a decentering of our intentionality (Fuchs and
De Jaegher, 2009, p. 476). Like Schutz, he assumes that this
direct engagement offers an immediate and often quite intimate
experience of the other’s consciousness. Unlike Schutz, however,
he seems to assume that it also grants a quite extensive, immediate
understanding of the meaning they assign to their experience.
This, Schutz would insist, is where we must distinguish between
subjective and intersubjective meaning.
On a Schutzian analysis, what we share in cases of mutual
incorporation is strictly speaking not our intentionality, in the
sense of directly participating in each other’s acts of meaning-
endowment. Instead we attune and align our individual meaning-
endowments and then share the meaning-content constituted
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by these intentional operations. Thanks to the intersubjective
character of the meaning-content each of us assign to our
experiences, we are likely to assign similar content to many of
the experiences we share during our interaction, thereby making
your acts of meaning-endowment (including your emotions in
Fuchs’ broad sense) immediately intelligible to me. But this is
due to a contingent overlap in the individual acts of meaning-
endowment that each of us perform and the greater the difference
in our past experience, cultural background etc., the greater the
risk that our acts of meaning-endowment drift apart and I end up
misunderstanding you.
Such misunderstandings are often quite subtle and of little
practical importance to our social interaction and as such they
pose no threat to Fuchs’ claim that the immediate understanding
derived from direct perception provides the predominant basis
for everyday human interaction. The very negligibility of our
misunderstandings, however, also points to a fundamental
limitation in Fuchs’ account of empathy: how can we know
whether we really understand the other’s experience or not? Since
direct perception offers no access to the process of meaning-
endowment, it provides no independent justification for our
ascriptions of meaning-content to the experience of others and
no means for detecting possible errors—except for the one’s that
incidentally disclose themselves in the course of our interaction.
We are therefore liable to miss the often quite subtle differences
between our own perspective and that of the other.
The “interbodily resonance” and “bodily memory” that Fuchs
points to as enabling our direct perception of others’ intentional
states certainly provides some justification for the empathizer’s
assignment of meaning-content to the target’s state (cf. Stueber,
2006, p. 142–147). Even though the human capacities to interact
with and understand others in immediate and pre-reflective ways
are indeed impressive, however, they can only take us so far.
Consider a 3 year-old giving her father a picture she has painted.
It is immensely plausible that due to their interactive history she
possesses an “implicit,” bodily knowledge of his reaction (Fuchs
and De Jaegher, 2009; Fuchs, 2016; cf. Lyons-Ruth et al., 1998),
that creates an immediate understanding and maybe even an
anticipation of his reaction—her entire bodily posture reflects
her enjoyment of the gratitude and compliments she is about to
receive, even before the picture has left her hands. But all this—
and this really is quite a bit of complex, social understanding—
tells the child nothing about whether her father’s reaction is
caused by the picture, her act of generosity, or whether he is just
being polite in order not to let her expectations down.
Fuchs never points to any mechanisms capable of providing
such understanding. Empathy as he construes it may therefore
provide us with a fairly reliable insight into what others
experience, but arguably, his exclusive focus on recognitional
capacities fails to acknowledge that we are not always just after
the “what” of others’ intentional states. Quite often the question
driving our interest is how they came to see things or act this
way. Moreover, these two types of understanding are plausibly
seen as mutually informing: if my daughter gets the suspicion
that I am dissimulating my joy, this conscious and reflective
suspicion is likely to impact her immediate bodily reaction to my
expressions of joy, regardless of the sincerity of my expressions
(cf. Schmidsberger and Löffler-Stastka, 2018 who raise a similar
point against Fuchs).
As opposed to the parallel assignment of the same content to
a shared experience, we therefore suggest, the attempt to grasp
the meaning-content of others, as this really appears to them, is a
more ambitious task to the degree that it aims at understanding
not just what the other intends, but also how and why they
intend it. This involves a broadening in the scope of our other-
directed intentionality from a sole focus on the meaning-content
of the target’s state to include the act of meaning-endowment
producing that content.
Given that meaning-endowments are not directly observable,
mostly eluding even the subjects own introspective “glance,”
reflecting on them is likely to include more than the direct
perception of their effects. Such understanding, it would
seem, relies on considerations about the context and processes
informing the target’s act of meaning-endowment as entailed
by ToM and “folk psychology” (Stueber, 2006, chap. 4) or
narrative competence (Gallagher, 2012a). We should therefore
not, as suggested by Fuchs, conceive of these reflective, cognitive
mechanisms as mere extensions or “deprived” versions of our
immediate perceptual capacities, but as granting their own
distinctive type of social understanding.
The very operation of trying to understand the meaning-
endowments of others thus bears a close affinity to the act
by which we focus attention on our own acts of meaning-
endowment. Understanding e.g., why I reacted with fury in a
given situation is not that different from understanding why you
did so. Both operations necessarily focus on already elapsed (or
future) experiences and both imply a shift from the engaged and
immediate experience of the world to a sort of meta-perspective
on how we/the other experience it. Reflection thus imposes
a certain distance and loss of immediacy, but in contrast to
the heuristic methods of direct perception, it also opens our
understanding of the other to conscious evaluation and revision
and thereby enables a dialogue between the interacting subjects.
In this sense, the reflective engagement with the experiences of
others may be said to offer a deeper and more truly interpersonal
understanding. Whereas the first-person experience of your
intentionality is strictly speaking only accessible to you (with
the possibilities of interpersonal resonance and shared meaning
production opened up by direct interaction), it thus seems
possible that others possess a deeper reflective understanding of
your acts of meaning-endowment than you do yourself. After all,
it is not uncommon that it takes an outside observer to make
you aware that you are attributing a certain meaning to certain
phenomena. In that instance the outside observer, in virtue of
her correct hypothesis about your unconsciously experienced
meaning, can reasonable be said to have possessed a deeper
understanding of your intentional state than you did yourself.
This suggests that both with regard to self- and other-
awareness we should recognize two distinct ways of
understanding an intentional state: an immediate, perceptual
grasp and a reflective interpretation [cf. Stueber’s (2006)
distinction between basic and reenactive empathy and
Gallagher’s (Gallagher, 2012a,b) distinction between “low-
level” and “high-level” processes]. One might, we suggest, speak
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of an “enactive” and a “reflective” understanding of others,
thereby highlighting the immediate, interactive, and embedded
character of the former, which derives from interbodily
resonance, and the meta-perspective on the other’s intentional
states implied by the latter.
Empathy, as an other-awareness directed specifically at
the affective states of others, aims at both these types of
understanding, we take it, but to variable degrees depending on
the context. We have pointed to Fuchs’ analysis of interbodily
resonance as providing a convincing account of the processes
enabling enactive understanding, while we believe that reflective
understanding to some degree relies on all the processes
associated with ToM, folk psychology and narrative competence.
The significance of these perceptual and interpretive processes
in producing empathy, however, is not limited to the epistemic
aspects we have focused on so far. They also have a significant
impact on the affective attitude we adopt toward others.
Fuchs briefly touches on the other-directed, affective aspects
of empathy in distinguishing empathic engagements from other,
more objectifying types of interaction (Fuchs, 2013, p 660–661)
but he never develops these ideas further. In the following section,
we suggest that empathic engagements based on interbodily
resonance are in fact characterized by a basic pro-attitude toward
the other. We develop this suggestion with inspiration from the
ancient Stoics and their theory of oikeiōsis or attachment. Based
on a theory of perception and intentional action that is closely
similar to Fuchs’ concepts of bodily resonance and affective
intentionality, these ancient Greek philosophers developed an
analysis of interpersonal relations and prosocial motivation that,
so we suggest, can usefully supplement Fuchs’ concept of primary
empathy and help us understand the affective aspects of this
emotional phenomenon.
AFFECTIVE INTENTIONALITY: BODILY
RESONANCE AND STOIC ATTACHMENT
The Stoic school established itself as an influential intellectual
tradition under the leadership of Zeno, Cleanthes, and
Chrysippus in the generations just after Plato and Aristotle
and it came to dominate many of the philosophical debates
throughout the Hellenistic world well into the second century
CE. As part of their overarching project of figuring out how
human beings can come to live in perfect harmony with
themselves and the world around them, these highly original
thinkers developed a sophisticated analysis of how humans
orient themselves in the world, their so-called theory of oikeiōsis.
The structuring idea of this theory is an ability to recognize
different things as belonging or proper to oneself (gr. oikeion).
This, according to the Stoics, produces a sense of attachment
(oikeiōsis) that structures our perception of the world in much
the same way as we perceive our environment in terms of
“affective affordances,” i.e., the affective qualities it possesses for
us, on Fuchs’ account of affective intentionality.
Based on rather crude, but for their time groundbreaking
physical and medical theories, the Stoics describe the perceptual
processes underlying this intentionality in highly visceral terms
as a consequence of our material soul rubbing against the body,
with which it is coextensive and thoroughly blended:
For the soul extends outward with an expansion and strikes all
the parts of the body, since it is also mixed with all of them, and
when it strikes them it is struck back in turn. For the body too
offers resistance, just like the soul: and the affection ends up being
simultaneously characterized by pressure and counterpressure
[Hierocles, 2009, p. 13 (IV.44–49)].
The affections (pathē, a term that also means feelings or
emotions) produced through this interaction of body and soul
are also described as a reciprocal co-affection between the two—
sympatheia in ancient Greek [Hierocles, 2009, p .11 (IV.1–22)].
It produces not only an awareness of the various parts of our
body but also an instinctual grasp (antilēpsis) of their functions
and needs [Hierocles, 2009, p. 3–9 (I.1-III.19); and Seneca, 2007,
p. 85–89 (121.5–6 and 22–24); with Long, 1996; Brittain, 2002,
p. 266–269; Klein, 2016, 172–176]. This, in turn, explains how
we perceive external objects. When we encounter something,
it affects our body and the soul registers this affection making
us aware both of the object and how it affects us [Hierocles,
2009, p. 16 (VI.1–9)]. Depending on whether this affection is
perceived to fit with our immediate constitution and needs, it will
appear either proper (oikeion), foreign (allotrion), or neither to
us [Hierocles, 2009, p. 9–11 (III.20–54); and Seneca, 2007, 88–89
(121.17–21); with Brittain, 2002, p. 269–271].
The continuous awareness or co-perception (synaisthesis) of
ourselves also results in a feeling of attachment (oikeiōsis) and
a basic disposition to show concern (tērein) for ourselves—we
recognize the various aspects of our constitution as proper to
us and therefore start caring for them—and this in turn, is said
to produce impulses to pursue things that are oikeion and avoid
their opposites [Laertius, 1925, p. 193 (VII.85); Cicero, 2001,
p. 69–70 (III.16–18); Seneca, 2007, p. 85–89; Hierocles, 2009, 17–
21 (VI.28–VII.50); with Klein, 2016, p. 165–178]. An impulse
(hormē), on the Stoic account, is thus the psychic event causing an
animal’s body to move (Inwood, 1985, p. 42–101; Brennan, 2003;
Graver, 2007, p. 24–28). For instance, when I am hungry and see
a banana, I recognize the banana as suitable nourishment, i.e.,
as oikeion to me, and eating the banana therefore strikes me as
appropriate (kathēkon) resulting in an impulse to eat the banana.
On the Stoic view, there are thus four psychological
mechanisms underlying every action:
1. the perception of something as oikeion, allotrion or neither
through bodily affections/feelings (corresponding to the
embodied appraisal of affective affordances on Fuchs’
account of affective intentionality)
2. the natural tendency to feel attachment toward things we
recognize as oikeion
3. the disposition to show concern (tērein) for ourselves and,
derivatively, the things we feel attached to
4. the impulse to move (corresponding to Fuchs’ e-motions).4
4A note of clarification: The analogy that we suggest is between Fuchs’
bodily feelings and the so-called “hormetic,” i.e., impulse-producing, impressions
(hormētikai phantasiai), not the subspecies of misguided reactions that the Stoics
provocatively called emotions (Graver, 2007, p. 15–34). The Stoics thus analyzed
the reaction to multisensory stimuli into two distinct psychic events: impressions,
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Despite the dualistic coloring of their terminology5 the Stoic
concept of a sympatheia between body and soul therefore bears
a close resemblance to Fuchs’ concept of bodily resonance: Both
make bodily feelings the medium of affective intentionality and
both see these affections as entailing an awareness both of the
object affecting you and of yourself being affected, accompanied
by a tendency to act. The Stoics, however, add the crucial elements
of self-attachment and -concern.
Fuchs’ speaks more neutrally of the self-reference involved
in affective intentionality (Fuchs and Koch, 2014; cf. Slaby
and Stephan, 2008). This would seem to involve some kind
of basic pro-attitude toward oneself—a recognition of myself
as “me” and a wish to preserve this self, similar to the self-
perception, -attachment, and -concern posited by the Stoics—but
this remains somewhat unclear: “They (sc. Emotions) always
imply a particular relation to the feeling subject in its very core:
through emotions, I experience how it is for me to be in this or that
situation. To be afraid of an approaching lion (world-reference)
means at the same time being afraid for oneself (self-reference).
Each emotion, thus, implies the two poles of feeling something
and feeling oneself as inextricably bound together.” (Fuchs and
Koch, 2014, p. 3, their emphasis). “Feeling oneself ” here seems
to include both a perception of oneself (“I experience how it is
for me”) and a concern for oneself (“being afraid for oneself ”).
This ambiguity between perception/understanding and concern
pervades Fuchs’ account of bodily resonance and to some extent
it is inherent in the very words “feeling” and “affection.” The
Stoics, on the other hand, effectively dissolve this ambiguity by
analyzing the co-perception of the self into the three closely
linked, but distinct elements of perception, attachment, and
concern: Through my bodily feelings I perceive myself being
affected, I recognize this self as something I feel attached to,
and therefore I care about what happens to me. The Stoic
theory of attachment can therefore helpfully supplement Fuchs’
phenomenological analysis of “incorporation” by providing a
terminology for the relational aspects of this way of “having a
world” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 169) and the affective value it
supposes us to ascribe to our own body and its surroundings.
defined as an “alteration” or “affection (pathos) that happens in the soul and
shows in itself the thing that produced it” [Long and Sedley, 1987, p. 237 (39B,
Aëtius 4.12.2); with Brittain, 2002, p. 259–261]; and impulses (hormē), defined
as a “movement” in the soul, which follows upon these affections when they
are productive of impulses (Inwood, 1985, p. 42–66; Brennan, 2003). When
this reaction is appropriate, it results in a “proper act” (kathēkon), when it is
inappropriate, in an emotion (pathos again). In adults, these reactions presuppose
a reflective act of “assent” to the hormetic impression (whereas in children
and animals it follows directly on the impressions), but besides these (at least
potentially) reflective reactions the Stoics also recognized a set of pre-reflective and
therefore uncontrollable reactions called pre-emotions (propatheiai), i.e., bodily
reactions which are independent of our assent (Graver, 2007, p. 85–108).
Parallel to Fuchs, we suggest, the Stoics thus see bodily affections/feelings
as constituting an embodied appraisal of the environment in terms of oikeion,
allotrion or neutral, which entails both an affection (the impression) and
expression (the pre-emotion) caused by the external stimuli, while the impulses
following upon this appraisal correspond to Fuchs’ concept of a movement
tendency or “e-motion.”
5In overt rejection of Platonic dualism, the Stoics in fact stress the holistic unity of
body, soul and intellectual mind (Gill, 2006). Cf. Fuchs’ rejection of “the Cartesian
framework” of traditional cognitive science (e.g., Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009,
p. 468; Fuchs, 2017, p. 27–30).
As Fuchs stresses incorporation is “a pervasive characteristic
of the lived body, which always transcends itself and partly
merges with the environment.” (Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009,
p. 472). This includes the unidirectional integration of an object
into the sensorimotor schema of the lived body which allows
us to interact and coordinate with it as e.g., the blind person
incorporates a cane; but it also covers the “intercorporeality”
or “mutual incorporation” made possible through the reciprocal
interbodily resonance between two living subjects (Fuchs and
De Jaegher, 2009, cf. Merleau-Ponty, 1962). The latter type
of incorporation, as Fuchs points out, enables us to perceive
and respond immediately to the affective states of others, but
whereas he goes into considerable detail about the kind of
perception he takes to be characteristic of such direct empathy,
his account of the affective responses appropriate to empathy
remains underdeveloped. The richer Stoic concept of attachment,
however, offers the conceptual means for spelling out and clearly
delineating the scope of these aspects of empathy.
Not unlike Fuchs, the Stoics held that the sympatheia
characterizing the interaction of body and soul extends beyond
your own organism. In principle, it extends to the entire universe
which for them is a compound of body (or matter, hyle) and soul
(or fiery air, pneuma) just like the human organism (Brouwer,
2015). On this basis they seem to have posited some limited
possibilities of sharing affective states with other living beings
and the world at large (see Brouwer, 2015 for a more detailed
discussion), but in contrast to Fuchs, they never seem to have
explored the possible epistemic implications of this doctrine6.
Instead, their analysis of social interaction, like that of self-
perception, is carried out in terms of attachment and concern.
While our most fundamental feelings of attachment pertain
to ourselves and our constitution, this attitude extends well
beyond the borders of our own body to include anything that we
recognize as oikeion to us. Occasionally this attitude was analyzed
into the basic well-disposed (eunoētikē) attachment toward
ourselves which determines the selective (hairetikē) attachment
we feel toward external things and the affectionate (sterktikē)
attachment we feel toward other people (Hierocles, 2009, p. 25
[IX.1-10]; cf. Anonymus, 1995, VII–VIII).
The fact that the Stoics used the same term to describe such
different relations suggests that they saw a basic similarity in the
character of those relations. The surviving Stoic texts, however,
do not offer any univocal explanation of what it is that makes
something qualify as oikeion—apart from the formal answer
that everything that is part of or somehow agrees with our
constitution is oikeion to us (cf. Klein, 2016)—but the etymology
of the term provides some fascinating hints about how the Stoics
envisioned the relations it describes. Oikeion thus derives from
oikos (“house” or “household”) and most directly it describes the
relation one has toward the people and things one was brought
up with. By extension, it came to apply to aspects of one’s own
6The Stoics were e.g., (in)famous for claiming that in the ideal case one would be
able to feel the effect of another person stretching out her finger at the other end of
the world and share the joy of this movement if it was carried out well [Plutarch,
1976, p. 730–731 (Comm. not. 1068F)]. This, however, would be a case of sharing
(in Scheler’s sense of feeling the same due to the same event) and therefore involves
no social understanding.
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organism. Its Stoic meaning is therefore perhaps best captured
by the English “proper” or “akin” (see further Pembroke, 1971).
By contrast, the word idios (“personal, private, peculiar to you”)
more directly describes something that belongs to you as opposed
to others7. The choice of the word oikeion to describe the way
we perceive our own organism may thus be taken to reflect a
view of the subject as deeply embedded in a social context and
community rather than a more or less isolated individual8.
Similar to the lived body in phenomenological theories of
perception (see e.g., Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Gallagher, 2005, chap.
1), the “self ” (in the Stoic sense of the mind-cum-body also
referred to as our “constitution”) is the pivotal point of our
intentionality. The attachment and concern we feel toward this
self furthermore explain the affective value we attribute to the
things we perceive and our motivations to care for, pursue or
avoid them. As for Fuchs, this perceptual process is pre-reflective
and non-verbal. Our perceptions can be verbalized and reflected
upon, but they happen through the medium of bodily feelings or
affections9.
On this view, the attribution of affective value to something,
and thereby your concern for it, depends on the establishment
of a relation between that object or person and your “self ”—on
you seeing them as part of or at least relevant to who you are
and what you want. But this self is not a stable or monolithic
thing. It is subject to constant change and re-configuration during
a lifetime, and with it the things and people we recognize as
oikeion change. The image of the household, at the root of
the concept of attachment (or appropriation, as oikeiōsis is also
frequently translated), is suggestive. Just like the members of
your household, your furniture etc. change, and with them the
constitution of your household, so your “self ” and the things you
recognize as belonging to it changes. The late Stoic Hierocles,
(2009, p. 91–93 [apud Stob. 4.84.23]; cf. Cicero, 1991, 21–
25 [I.50–60]) thus portrays the social world of every human
being as structured in circles of ever more attenuated bonds of
attachments, from your own body over your closest kin to the
most remote stranger.
On its most convincing interpretation, the Stoic theory of
attachment therefore reflects what Algra (2003) has called a
model of “extended partiality.” On this view, the attachment
toward one’s own organism may—at least at the outset of human
development—represent a privileged relation, but in principle it
is no different from the attachment we feel toward other things
that are within our sphere of interest and concern. Attachment,
7Idios is the etymological root of the, often derogatory, term idiōtēs, which signifies
the private citizen as opposed to the citizen actively taking part in the duties of the
political community. Interestingly, we find [Plato (1997), 1,089 (462b)] coining
the word idiōsis (“privatization” from idios, parallel to oikeiōsis from oikeios),
contrasting it with koinōnia, “community.”
8The Stoics were of course picking up on already established general and
philosophical usages of the term oikeion (although they did to all appearances
use the term far more systematically than any of their predecessors and thereby
probably helped extend its meanings). To some degree the communal mindset
we ascribe to them here was thus part of their cultural background. For a good
discussion of how this mind set is reflected in Stoic social philosophy, see Algra
(2003).
9Whereas Fuchs conceives of bodily feelings as non-representational (see e.g.,
Froese and Fuchs, 2012, p. 207, 213), however, this does not seem to be the case
with the Stoics (Sorabji, 1993, p. 20–28; Brittain, 2002).
on the Stoic conception, thus transcends the boundaries of the
individual agent bringing a broader range of things within our
sphere of concern and making them the co-reference point
of our actions. It constitutes an extension of our affective
intentionality, not only making the other affectively relevant
to us but effectively including her interests in our sphere of
concern. This model of extended partiality fascinatingly cuts
across the entrenched modern distinction between egoistic and
altruistic motivations and perforates the borders between “self ”
and “other” in ways that are suggestive of many modern,
enactive, and phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity
and “intercorporeality”—including Fuchs’. The Stoic model of
extended partiality, we suggest, therefore provides a promising
way of describing the shift in motivations that accompanies the
decentering of our intentionality posited by his account.
To sum up, we have argued that in order to fully grasp the
significance of interbodily resonance and mutual incorporation
in enabling empathic, social engagements one must take into
account both its epistemic and affective aspects. We have
suggested that the latter be analyzed along the lines of the Stoic
theory of attachment and concern. On this account, empathy
can be seen to imply a basic pro-attitude toward the other, a
perception of the other that presents her as a proper object for our
attachment. This, in turn, produces a concern that can generate
the prosocial motivation to help her in particular circumstances
or a more general attitude of extended partiality toward her.
In the following section, we shall relate this model of empathic





Having examined both the epistemic and affective aspects of
interbodily resonance in some detail, delineating its plausible
effects in enabling social understanding and prosocial attitudes,
we may now proceed to develop our attempt at a comprehensive
account of empathy.
In the section “Empathy: Cognitive, Emotional, Primary,
and Extended,” we examined the embodied basis of social
understanding in interbodily resonance but argued for the need
to acknowledge both a reflective and an enactive type of social
understanding. As maintained by Fuchs, enactive understanding
quite plausibly supplies the necessary prerequisites for developing
ToM and these two ways of engaging with the intentions
and perspectives of others remain tightly integrated and
mutually informing. Nonetheless, they are different capacities,
accounting for different kinds of understanding and empathic
engagement: enactive understanding offers an immediate access
to the meaning-content of intentional states, while reflective
understanding reasons about the subjective meaning and acts of
meaning-endowments underlying such states.
Following Fuchs, we see interbodily resonance as fundamental
both to direct empathic engagement and to the acquisition
of empathic capacities, but with inspiration from the ancient
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FIGURE 1 | The distinctive elements of empathy. This figure shows empathy as involving social understanding of both the enactive and reflective type, a sense of
attachment toward to other and a concern for them that can motivate the empathizer to undertake action in the interest of the target person. Other-concern, we take
it, arises on the basis of understanding, attachment, or both (as indicated by the downward arrows in the figure). The arrows between the two latter states indicate
that these are most plausibly seen as mutually informing and re-enforcing (attachment can produce an increased propensity to engage in attempts to understand the
other, just like an understanding of the other can produce attachment toward them).
Stoics we have argued that this type of interaction also creates
feelings of attachment and concern. On our account, this pro-
attitude toward others characterizes any empathic engagement
and distinguishes such engagements from more objectifying,
disengaged, or “cold-blooded” instances of social understanding.
As we argued in the section “Social Understanding: Enactive
and Reflective” above, attachment and the entailed recognition
of the other as a proper object of concern furthermore suggests a
conceptualization of the prosocial behavior often associated with
empathy in terms of extended partiality.
Based on these discussions we believe that the relation between
the epistemic, affective, and motivational aspects of empathic
engagements as in Figure 1.
On this model, empathy is a complex emotional phenomenon
that involves three distinct other-related states allowing for
varying degrees of intensity and shifting interrelations: an
understanding of the other’s affective state, a feeling of
attachment toward the other, and a concern for them. It is
important to note that the individual processes underlying these
states can of course also operate in isolation or appear in other
constellations: one can understand the state that someone else
is in without feeling neither attachment nor concern toward
them (cf. Zahavi’s expert torturer), just like understanding alone
can produce concern without any elements of attachment (cf.
Bloom’s 2017a, b, concept of “rational compassion”). Similarly,
one can feel attachment toward someone else without even trying
to understand them, and this can likewise produce concern. What
we take to be distinctive of empathy, however, is the co-presence
and interplay of these processes and states.
Rather than narrowing the scope of empathy to the
imaginative simulation of the other’s affective state, as suggested
by de Vignemont and colleagues, or to the immediately
perceptual and purely epistemic engagement with others’ states,
as suggested by Zahavi, we thus define empathy in virtue
of the co-presence of its constitutive elements. Empathy, on
our account, therefore differs from mindreading more broadly
by implying an attachment and concern for the other. On
this account, the mindreading of Zahavi’s expert torturer
does not count as empathy; just like her good twin, the
rationally compassionate helper who acts out of a fully detached
appreciation of someone else’s needs and an impartial, prosocial
motivation, does not empathize. Also, we take empathy to be
specifically concerned with the affective states of others (or
emotions in Fuchs’ broad sense) and only incidentally with non-
valenced beliefs and perceptual states.
On the other hand, empathy differs from purely affective types
of experiential sharing, like emotional contagion or a collective
reaction to some event, by entailing an understanding of the
other’s affective state10. This epistemic element also distinguishes
empathy from more general feelings of pity or sympathy, but if
sympathy is conceived broadly as just any benevolent emotional
response to others’ affective states, empathy can of course be
considered a type of sympathy11. Likewise, empathy differs from
the mere feeling of concern, that is an element of it, and
the motivation to help, that is a frequent consequence of it.
On this account, empathy can therefore both be seen as a
distinctively affective type of mindreading and a distinctively
epistemic type of sympathy.
The distinctive feature of our account is thus the integration
of understanding, attachment, and concern as constitutive parts
of empathy. This conception of empathy is comprehensive
in the sense that it encompasses the epistemic, affective and
motivational aspects of empathy. It thereby addresses both of
Batson’s questions regarding empathy and insists that a proper
answer to either requires us to consider the other as well. This
is done on the grounds that social understanding, attachment
10Note, however, that emotional contagion and sharing, on our account, can lead to
empathy if they bring about an awareness that the other is experiencing a similar
affective state and this awareness is accompanied by a feeling of attachment and
concern toward them.
11Sympathy carries shifting meanings, many of which overlap with the concept of
empathy, but often it simply appears as an umbrella term for benevolent emotional
responses to others (for a good overview, see Stueber, 2006, p. 28–31).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 January 2021 | Volume 11 | Article 531688
fpsyg-11-531688 December 31, 2020 Time: 19:22 # 12
Søvsø and Burckhardt Into Your (S)Kin
and concern appear to correlate in ways that elude us when
studied in isolation.
Our working definition tries to convey this complexity,
in terms that stay neutral with regard to the exact nature
of the processes and mechanisms involved, as a benevolent
engagement with the affective states of others which provides
us with a grasp of their state and produces an affective
response within our bodies. As mentioned in the section
“Empathy: Cognitive, Emotional, Primary, and Extended” above,
recent philosophical and empirical debates on empathy have
generally focused on questions regarding the scope and
importance of different psychological processes in enabling
social understanding. Proponents of rivaling accounts, however,
tend to agree that a full account of social understanding is
likely to involve some combination of all the processes under
consideration (Stueber, 2006; O’Shea, 2012; Fuchs, 2017; Gallese
and Sinigaglia, 2018; Fernandez and Zahavi, 2020). By merely
stipulating that empathy “provides a grasp of the other’s state”
our definition allows for different construals of how these
processes figure and interact in empathy. In order to clarify the
scope of the different proposals, however, we have suggested
to distinguish clearly between the attainment of enactive and
reflective understanding.
With regard to the former type of understanding, we have
pointed to Fuchs’ concept of interbodily resonance and affective
intentionality as a convincing way to capture the embodied and
enactive character of these processes; but there are also serious
attempts to explain this in simulationalist terms (Gallese, 2003;
Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2018) just like theory-theory approaches
may incorporate many of the objections leveled against it by
proponents of phenomenological and 4E approaches (O’Shea,
2012). Our hope is that the account offered here may help
advance this debate as it relates to empathy by providing a
pluralistic, conceptual framework for studying the epistemic and
affective aspects of the relevant processes in combination thereby
allowing for a more holistic assessment of their significance in
enabling empathic engagements.
We thus take the processes producing empathic
understanding and attachment to be mutually informing.
As Cialdini et al. (1997) have pointed out an empathic concern
deriving from perspective taking, on the one hand, and feelings of
oneness, on the other, are likely to arise in the same contexts and
they appear sensitive to many of the same factors (relationship
closeness, severity of need etc.). This indicates that empathic
understanding and attachment are closely correlated and we
have pointed to the processes involved in interbodily resonance
as important factors in producing both. It is likewise plausible
to assume that empathic understanding can create or deepen
feelings of attachment, just like feelings of attachment are likely
to make you more prone to engage in an attempt to understand
the other person (cf. Batson and Shaw, 1991; Cialdini et al.,
1997).
Attachment has a long history as a term for describing the
intimate bonds between a child and its closest caregivers (see
e.g., the seminal paper by Bowlby, 1958) but it has not been
used systematically to describe wider social bonds (cf. Batson
and Shaw, 1991, p. 113). We have pointed to the Stoic theory
of attachment as providing a concise conceptual framework
for such an analysis of our social relations. On this theory,
our social bonds rely on a proneness to see other people as
oikeion to us and feel attachment and concern toward them,
parallel to the way we perceive our own body and certain
aspects of our environment as “belonging” to us. In extension
of Fuchs’ adoption of Gibson’s (1979) theory of affordances,
one might speak of “empathic affordances” and work toward
an understanding of the factors informing this social aspect of
our affective intentionality (factors such as kinship, similarity in
cultural background, racial prejudice etc. but, perhaps even more
importantly, purely bodily factors such as skin-to-skin-contact
(Ciaunica, 2017), olfactory intake etc.).
Both the phenomenological concept of incorporation and
the Stoic concept of attachment furthermore suggest that
our perception of others is in some respects parallel to
the way we perceive and relate to our own body. These
proprioceptive processes have received increasing attention
within contemporary psychology and neuroscience under the
umbrella term “Body Ownership” (BO) covering studies of
how we attach to/detach from our own limbs and bodies. The
quantitative and qualitative studies of BO have highlighted how
the sensation of something being my “own” body is dependent
on visual and tactile intake and is therefore highly sensitive
to manipulation of this intake—even to the degree that such
manipulation can create the temporary, illusory adoption of a
foreign limb or even an entire body as one’s own (Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998; Petkova et al., 2011; Maselli and Slater, 2013;
Guterstam et al., 2015).
An important future avenue for empirical studies of empathy,
suggested by our account and to some extent already being
pursued, is to transfer the insights gained in BO-scholarship
about the role of multisensory stimulation in producing
feelings of ownership/attachment toward our own body to the
intersubjective sphere, on the assumption that they play similar,
causal roles in determining how we relate to the bodies of others
(cf. Bertrand et al., 2018). Indeed, there is already tentative
evidence that adopting another limb (or avatar body) that has
a different skin tone also reduces implicit racial biases (Farmer
et al., 2012, 2014; Maister et al., 2013; Peck et al., 2013; Farmer
and Maister, 2017). The authors of these studies argue that
looking through another body and feeling body ownership to
it creates a kind of kinship which in turn lowers out-grouping
tendencies. These studies provide examples of how even an
illusory and temporary perception of someone else as oikeion—
literally perceiving a foreign limb or body as belonging to you—
impacts our attitude toward them, thereby raising important
questions about the role of (perceived) similarity or relatedness in
creating feelings of attachment, concern, and ultimately empathy,
and the importance of pre-reflective, bodily factors in shaping
such (a)kinship-perception.
Another important aspect of the Stoic account is the model
it provides for describing the prosocial motivation associated
with empathy. As brought out by the considerations above, the
prosocial motivation that derives from feelings of attachment is
inherently partial. It rests on the inclusion of others into your in-
group and only thereby into your sphere of concern: the two of us,
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we Europeans, we humans etc. By contrast, some theorists have
assumed that empathy can inspire genuinely altruistic action,
i.e., an ultimately selfless motivation to promote the wellbeing
of the other induced through perspective taking (Batson and
Shaw, 1991). As Cialdini et al. (1997) have convincingly shown,
however, feelings of oneness appear to have a far more decisive
impact on our decisions to help, suggesting that the potential
effects of empathic understanding on prosocial motivation are
mediated by such feelings.
This is conveyed by our insistence that empathy necessarily
involves a feeling of attachment toward the other and we
have described the resulting type of motivation as an extended
partiality, i.e., the inclusion of the other into our sphere of
concern based on a perception of the other as oikeion to
us. Herein lies the strengths and limitations of empathy as
a motivational force: it brings the affective states and needs
of its target into sharp focus, thereby inevitably forcing those
of others into the background (cf. Bloom, 2017a, b). Rather
than mobilizing us “against empathy,” however, this remarkable
capacity of human beings to extend their partiality in our
view leaves plenty of room for optimism about the moral
value of empathy.
CONCLUSION
After a brief review of recent debates about empathy this paper set
out to examine and expand upon the enactivist account offered by
Thomas Fuchs. Through a critical discussion of his conception
of bodily resonance as providing the basis for an immediate
understanding of other’s intentional states, we have argued for
the need to acknowledge the equal importance of reflective, social
understanding in everyday, human interaction and allow for
different processes to provide the predominant foundations of
these types of understanding.
As a distinctively affective, other-directed intentionality,
however, empathy does not merely consist in understanding the
affective states of others. It also involves an affective response
toward the other and their situation (as the empathizer perceives
this). This response, we have suggested, can be analyzed along the
lines of the Stoic theory of oikeiōsis as a feeling of attachment and
concern toward the other that arises on the basis of interbodily
resonance along with other, more reflective processes that makes
the other appear oikeion or (a)kin to us. This inclusion of the
other in one’s sphere of concern produces, in turn, a prosocial
motivation that can best be described as an extended partiality.
Based on these philosophical reflections we have proposed
an account of empathy as a complex emotional phenomenon
comprising epistemic, affective, and motivational elements and
we have briefly related the Stoic concepts we introduced in
order to describe its affective and motivational elements to
existing concepts within current debates about Body Ownership
and altruistic motivation. Our approach has been shamelessly
eclectic—integrating concepts from ancient Stoicism, modern
phenomenology, psychology, and neuroscience—but the result,
we submit, is an account of empathy that acknowledges the
complexities of this other-directed and inherently partial way of
engaging with others and can thereby help increase conceptual
clarity across the interdisciplinary field of empathy studies.
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